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The work of economist and philosopher Amartya Sen (1933-) has attracted 
attention in other fields too, including in political science, human geography, 
planning, health and social policy, and, to a lesser but growing extent, in 
sociology and occasionally anthropology. This paper, written as part of a 
project on Indian social theorists, discusses Sen’s relation to social theorizing. 
While he is not a ‘social theorist’ in the sense recognized in sociology and 
anthropology, being grounded instead in the earlier perspectives of Adam 
Smith, Condorcet and J.S. Mill, much of his work, both theoretical and 
empirical, proves of interest to a wide range of social scientists. The paper’s 
first main part outlines his contributions as a social analyst, under four 
connected headings: (1) theorization on how people reason as agents within 
society; (2) ‘entitlements analysis’ of the social determinants of people’s access 
or lack of access to goods; (3) theorizing the effective freedoms and agency 
that people enjoy or lack, in his ‘capability approach’ (CA); (4) treatments of 
societal membership, identity and political life, including a liberal theory of 
personal identity and a strong advocacy of and high expectations for ‘voice’ 
and deliberative democracy. The second part characterizes Sen’s intellectual 
style, marked by systematic conceptual refinement, associated emphases on 
complexity, heterogeneity, and individuality, including personal individuality, 
and a reformist optimism. The third part treats his relation to ‘social theory’ as 
considered by sociologists, including the connections, contributions and 
possible blind spots: in his attention to work by sociologists, in his system for 
theorizing human action in society, in treatment of power structures and 
capitalism, and in his optimistic programmatic conception of personhood that 
stresses the freedom to make a reasoned composition of personal identity. The 
final substantial part discusses his preoccupation with public reasoning and 
democracy, and the focus on an arguably idealized version of the former and 
relative neglect of the sociology of the latter. It contrasts the ideal of a 
reasoning polity with features and trends in independent India. Nevertheless, 
Sen’s programmes for critical autonomy in personhood and for reasoned 
politics carry significant normative force, and his analytical formats can help 
not only structured evaluation but investigation of obstacles to more 
widespread agency, voice and democratic participation. 
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Amartya Sen, social theorizing  
and contemporary India 
1 Introduction – a philosopher-economist who brings 
many tools 
This paper discusses the work of Amartya Sen viewed as a social theorist.1 He 
is an outlier in this regard, as a famous economist and philosopher who is a 
wide-ranging, acute, independent social commentator but not part of the 
disciplinary streams of sociology or anthropology. Sen works as an inter-
disciplinary philosopher-economist who has comprehensively reconnected 
economics and ethics (e.g., Sen 1987). Economics requires close partnership 
with ethics, for discussions on the ranking of alternative possible processes, 
pathways and outcomes but also for understanding behaviour, since people use 
and are influenced by ethical ideas. Sen engages too with epistemology and the 
philosophy of mind, and has used his various tools to focus economic analysis 
on the lives of real, diverse individuals, the interweaving factors that affect and 
constrain them, and how far people can and do achieve what they (reasonably 
could) consider important.  
His work has not aimed directly to contribute to the traditions of Western 
‘social theory’ that have developed since the mid-19th century (Callinicos 2007; 
Mouzelis 2008). He can be better understood as participating in projects of 
normatively oriented social economics, moral philosophy and political theory 
that build from other and older bases, including the work of Adam Smith 
(1723-90), the Marquis de Condorcet (1743-94) and John Stuart Mill (1806-73) 
(see, e.g., Duncan 1973, Gordon 1991). He has contributed towards a 
humanized and partly socialized economics, and a vision of a reasoning polity 
inspired by the Millian notion of democracy as ‘government by discussion’. 
Correspondingly, his foremost contemporary intellectual sparring-partners 
have been the economist Kenneth Arrow (1921-2017) and the philosopher 
John Rawls (1921-2002).  
Central in Sen’s work has been the ‘social choice’ perspective that extends 
Condorcet and Arrow. It focuses on “methods of marshalling information, 
particularly those relating to the people involved, to arrive at correct social 
judgments or acceptable group decisions” (Sen 1986: 1073). We can ask: does 
this normative ‘social choice theory’ contain much ‘social theory’? 2 Its 
theorizing, centred like Smith’s on a model of reflective individuals, needs 
deepened pictures of ‘the individual’ and of culture, to better understand 
politics, including for example crowds or populism. Even so, Sen has moved 
 
1 The paper was prepared for a project on Indian social theorists, led by Ananta K. 
Giri. I am grateful to John Davis, Javier Iguiñiz and Fernande Pool for helpful 
remarks. 
2 Sen’s magnum opus in social choice theory (2017a) does not refer to sociologists. 
Seabright (1989) is one of the few discussions on ‘Social Choice and Social Theories’ 
but concerns normative theories, not what sociologists understand as ‘social theory’. 
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far beyond a simple conception of persons as traditionally held in economics. 
He is as interested in the Smith of The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1790) as in the 
bastardized Smith who became patron-saint of free-markets theory. His focus 
has until recently remained though on influencing fellow economists and 
philosophers, and his links to sociology, anthropology, psychology and other 
social theory have been much thinner (see, e.g., his interview by Richard 
Swedberg – Sen 1990a; and Holmwood 2013). So, while upgrading parts of 
economists’ typically inadequate picture of persons—by for example 
introducing a category of ‘commitment’ towards the welfare of others or 
general causes, investigating the complexity of identity, and emphasising intra-
family disaggregation by gender—he has sometimes retained other parts of the 
limited conceptions of people and society in mainstream economics (Gasper 
2000, 2007a, 2009). Use of a very different picture of persons and agency could 
have lost much of his economics audience. The orientation had a price in the 
types of questions and methods he engaged with (see, e.g., Gasper 1997, 2002, 
Gasper & van Staveren 2003). However, the picture has continued to be 
refined and extended, both by Sen and by some of his associates.  
Sen’s work has aroused interest among a considerable number of co-
operators from other disciplines. Especially his capability approach has been an 
ongoing focus for attempts at enrichment by authors who seek to partner it 
with deeper analyses of agency, culture and personhood, drawing for example 
from Dewey (e.g., Kramm 2019, Zimmermann 2006, 2018), Durkheim and 
Parsons (Gangas 2020) or Bourdieu (e.g., Hart 2013, Pham 2019). And, 
second, in recent years Sen himself has published books of social analysis 
(2005a, 2006, 2015) addressed to general audiences but dealing deeply with 
issues of identity, identification, democracy and the meaning of ‘India’. We can 
consider how far these books strengthen his treatment of persons in society 
and how far his methods are likely to engage particular social science 
audiences. 
Born in Santiniketan in 1933, brought up initially in East Bengal and 
Burma, and educated in Dhaka and Santiniketan, Sen subsequently studied 
economics at Presidency College, Calcutta and Trinity College, Cambridge. 
After teaching economics in Cambridge, Calcutta and Delhi, he returned to 
Britain in 1971 and worked at the London School of Economics and the 
University of Oxford. Since 1987 he has been a professor in economics and 
philosophy at Harvard University in the USA, and also spent 1998 to 2004 as 
Master of his old Cambridge college in Britain. In 1998 he received the Nobel 
Prize for Economics and in 1999 the Bharat Ratna. He remains an Indian 
citizen and spends considerable time in India each year. Apart from regular 
analyses of Indian issues and materials in his work on development economics, 
public health, hunger and well-being, he has published several books 
specifically on India (Sen 2005a, 2015; Drèze & Sen 1995, 2002, 2013).  
Sen has been remarkably prolific for extraordinarily long, around sixty 
years. The present paper addresses only selected aspects, without space for 
most of his towering work in normative theory and extensive contributions on 
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economic development.3 Nor can it say much on how his ideas have evolved; 
we will note though an increasingly ambitious picture of persons, as actors who 
should be free to define their own identity. The first part notes some of his 
major contributions as a social analyst, under four headings: as a positive social 
economist who has illuminated, first, how people reason as agents within 
society, and, second, many of the social determinants of people’s access or lack 
of access to goods (in his ‘entitlements analysis’); third, as a normative social 
economist and ethical theorist, who has used concepts of ‘capability’ and 
‘agency’ to further explore the effective freedoms that people enjoy or lack; 
and, fourth, as a social and political philosopher who discusses personhood as 
multi-dimensional, stresses the freedom to make a reasoned composition of 
personal identity, and champions open deliberative democracy. The chapter’s 
second part then characterizes his intellectual style, marked by insistent 
conceptual refinement and analytical precision and associated emphases on the 
significance of complexity, heterogeneity, and individuality. The third part 
treats his relation to social theory, including connections, contributions and a 
set of possible important blind spots: in his attention to sociology, to 
theorizing human action in society, to power systems and capitalism, and in his 
optimistic programmatic conception of personhood. Arising from this, the 
fourth and final major part discusses his preoccupation with public reasoning 
and democracy, and the focus on an arguably idealized version of the former 
and relative neglect of the sociology of the latter. It contrasts the ideal of a 
reasoning polity with some features and trends in independent India. 
Nevertheless, Sen’s programmes for critical autonomy in personhood and for 
reasoned politics carry substantial normative force. 
Whatever limitations any of Sen’s formulations might have, many are 
widely found useable and useful—even inspirational—intellectual tools, open 
for partnering other tools and theories, by a range of researchers and actors 
across various fields, including in diverse spaces in sociology, social policy 
(including health and disability studies), education, governance and planning, 
technology studies, and development studies more generally. Their potentials 
and contributions are emergent and far from yet completed. 
 
3 For fuller exposition and assessment of some of Sen’s work in normative theory and 
analyses of personhood, freedom, well-being and politics, see e.g. Gasper (2002, 
2007a, 2007b, 2009). 
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2  Some fields of  major contribution 
I highlight here four major fields of contribution relevant for social theory. The 
first concerns how people reason, considering them as social actors. The 
second field contains analyses of who gets what in society, which Sen extends 
beyond the conventional frames in economics, in his ‘entitlements approach’ 
and associated gender-oriented analyses. The third covers theorizing on human 
freedom, in his ‘capability approach’ and his emphases on human agency and 
‘voice’. The last field contains his treatments of societal membership, 
citizenship and political life, including a liberal theory of personal identity and a 
strong advocacy of and high expectations for ‘voice’ and deliberative 
democracy. These fields interconnect and are applied together, as seen in most 
of Sen’s major works, such as The Idea of Justice (2009). 
2.1 How people reason about choices – humanizing 
economics I 
Sen became famous from the 1970s, through showing the absurd narrowness 
of so-called Rational Choice Theory (Sen 1977, 1985a). This asserted that only 
one type of choice (maximizing/optimizing, typically in terms only of self-
interest) was rational, as opposed to understanding rationality as choice on the 
basis of reasoning that one can sustain in the face of critical scrutiny (Sen 2009: 
180). “Rationality is an exercise of reasoning, valuation, and choice, not a fixed 
formula with a pre-specified maximand” (Rothschild & Sen 2006: 358). 
Identifying the type of reasoning which is appropriate in a situation itself 
requires justifiable reasoning.4 Several elements of this enriched 
conceptualisation of choice and reasoning deserve mention.  
First, Sen (1980/1) emphasised that there are many types of ‘utility’, 
though he has perhaps not always applied this insight (Gasper 2002: 450; 
2007a: 73-4). Underlying complexity of thought and affect are the complexity 
of evolution, of biographies and of daily experience. Economists from 
Bentham’s time onwards had mostly asserted that there is only one utility type, 
i.e. all experiences are commensurable (can be rated and compared on a single 
scale). This was for the convenience of being able to conduct a wideranging 
calculus for each person and across persons. Second, Sen clarified how non-
commensurability is not only routine in life but different from non-
comparability (e.g., 2009: 241); people are frequently able to adequately 
compare and choose between things that are not commensurable, so 
Bentham’s motivation was anyway partly misplaced. Third, later economists 
had taken fright at the potential radical redistributive implications that 
Bentham’s calculus could generate and had declared that “interpersonal 
 
4 However, when Sen argues that “The remedy for bad reasoning lies in better 
reasoning” (2009: 49), we should be careful. Sometimes reasoning will lead us to 
conclude that reasoning is a bad method for task T. 
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comparison of utilities has no meaning” (Arrow 1951: 9). But just as we hourly 
make comparisons of the non-commensurable, so we make interpersonal 
comparisons during every social interaction (Sen 2009: 278). That economists 
could for so long adopt the nonsensical claim repeated by Arrow reflects, 
fourth, the social moulding of people’s thoughts. 
So, fourth, people’s ideas, including their preferences are not formed and 
fixed outside society. Sen makes much use of the notion of ‘adaptive 
preference’, as one reason for not considering preference-fulfilment as an 
overriding or first-ranking normative criterion. The concept of adaptive 
preferences covers how one’s thinking adapts to normalize one’s situation; 
privileged people can become blind to their privileges or consider them only 
normal, and disadvantaged people may sometimes count only their blessings, 
not their deprivations.5 Much of this adaptation involves internalization of 
social norms, such as the belief that girls require fewer opportunities than boys. 
Followers of Sen and Nussbaum have developed the counter-concept of 
‘capability to aspire’ (e.g., Walker 2007, Hart 2013), which modulates Arjun 
Appadurai (2004)’s notion of ‘capacity to aspire’, seeing it as a meta-capability 
that underpins most specific capabilities.  
Fifth, while people internalize many social norms, norms operate in 
various ways. Respecting other people’s goals, to a considerable extent, is a 
social norm of good behaviour; it does not mean to change one’s own goals 
and adopt those of the others (Sen 2007b; 2009: 193).  
Sixth, related to that but involving more too, people (usually) do not 
reason only in terms of personal self-interest. They also commit to social 
ideals, including through personal reflection not only socialization. 
Correspondingly, Kautilya’s stress on only carrots and sticks was one-sided, 
although Ashoka’s extreme hopes for reform through sermons and dialogue 
was overenthusiastic too (Sen 2009: 76-77). Adam Smith (1790) had 
distinguished, first, sympathy, where one feels for/with others, e.g. feels better 
when they prosper; second, generosity, where one sacrifices some of one’s 
well-being for known others; and third, public spirit, where one sacrifices for a 
wider group, by adopting the standpoint of the nation. Sen from the 1970s 
advanced the concept of ‘commitment’, which spans Smith’s ‘generosity’ and 
‘public spirit’. He acknowledges now that Smith’s distinctions were more 
refined (Sen 2009: 185; 188fn.), but has also extended them, adding the 
cosmopolitan spirit of human rights, not confined by national boundaries. As 
an example of the influence in economic decision-making of public spirit and 
‘non-economic’ factors like ideas of national loyalty, he notes how British 
capital had stayed away from investing in Indian textiles and iron-and-steel 
during the era in which Britain exported heavily to India in those sectors. As a 
conscious reaction, the Tata family dynasty chose out of many possible sectors 
 
5 Zimmermann (2018: 940-1) offers an example: “our inquiry into training capabilities 
shows that the employees who were most deprived of access to vocational training 
were paradoxically those – all other factors being equal – who were least likely to 
express any discontent regarding a perceived lack of training or to express any desire 
for such (Lambert et al., 2012).” 
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to invest first in cotton textiles, and then around 1905, far less obviously, to go 
for iron-and-steel (Sen 2005a). Clearly though, much more remains to be said 
about the types of values and emotions that can be involved in people’s 
choices within society (e.g.: Durkheim 1893; Nussbaum 2013; Gangas 2020, 
Ch.5). 
Seventh, Sen neither stands the person outside society nor merges the 
person into society. His notion of positional objectivity highlights the cognitive 
independence but specific location of each observer, though not the social 
moulding of cognition. ‘Positional objectivity’ refers to when different 
observers have the same perception when viewing from the same 
observational position, while allowing that their perceptions can differ when 
the observational positions differ. This position-based comprehension often 
leads to biases concerning issues where we need transpositional understanding 
(Sen 2009: 162-3). Such biases can sometimes be overcome, though not always 
fully. 
Much of this enriched conceptualisation can be seen as basic social theory 
that had become suppressed in modern economics. (“Economists discover the 
power of social norms to influence decisions”, proudly declared a headline in 
The Economist newspaper, as of 8th February 2020; p.62.) Drawing on reflective 
philosophers and social economists, from Buddha and Aristotle through Smith 
to J.S. Mill, Sen helped to (re-)introduce such distinctions into formal 
economics. His discussion of reasoning, norms, ‘commitment’ and objectivity 
continues in the same philosophical style as these predecessors, without much 
reference to evidence from modern psychology on the thought processes, the 
accompanying emotions, their evolutionary basis or so on (unlike, e.g., van 
Staveren 2001).6 The limited engagement with psychology is perhaps seen in 
his claim that rationality does not require non-self-interested motivations (e.g., 
2009: 194). While correct as a clarification of formally stipulated concepts, and 
for computers, it is perhaps questionable as an empirical claim for humans, for 
example because our positional biases become more extreme when not 
balanced by the broader attention and learning that arise from sympathy, 
generosity and public spirit.7 Extreme cases of positional bias can be found 
throughout history in regard to many perceptions of, for example, famines and 
hunger. 
 
6 Similarly, Sen’s remarks on needs theory (e.g., 2013; 2017a: 25, 478) do not connect 
to the needs literatures in psychology and social policy. Where he does connect to 
psychology, he does not always recognise it as such. He refers to “Scitovsky’s 
analysis—part economic, part sociological—of ‘the joyless economy’” (2009: 273); but 
Scitovsky (1976/1992) was grounded more in psychology and brain sciences research 
than in sociology.  
7 Similarly, Sen (2007a) on “Why Exactly is Commitment Important for Rationality?” 
does not address the psychology of self and reasoning. 
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2.2 Entitlements analysis – socializing economics 
Entitlements analysis, “a socially disaggregated, institutionally aware, analysis of 
effective command over specific necessities” (Gasper 1993: 679), grew out of 
Sen’s work on explanation of famines (1981) and became applied to investigate 
hunger and poverty more generally (Drèze & Sen 1989; Gasper 1993). The 
entitlements approach generated a framework for identifying possible policy 
responses including through diverse forms of ‘public action’: action in the 
public sphere not only action by governments. This was extended in later work 
on human development (e.g., Drèze & Sen 2002) and human security (see e.g. 
Gasper & Gomez 2014) that gives systematic attention to multiple lines of 
vulnerability.  
Sen placed in context the emphasis on social relativity of poverty that was 
found in much theorizing in rich countries, by underlining the reality of 
absolute poverty such as seen in famines. At the same time his analysis of 
famines took a socially disaggregated view of this absolute poverty. During the 
huge Bengal famine of 1943-44, in which two to three million people died 
prematurely, there was adequate aggregate food availability and most people in 
Bengal suffered little or no extra hardship; but due to wartime-related policies, 
restrictions and market shifts, certain groups such as landless labourers, rural 
artisans and fisherpeople lost the ability to command sufficient food via 
markets and had no or insufficient other access. They lacked ‘entitlements’, 
socially enforceable claims. Entitlements analysis studies effective or legitimate 
command over goods, and its various channels and determinants, including 
attention to the rules and institutions that control access, and to the distinctive 
positions and vulnerabilities of different groups. It shows the centrality of 
enforceable rights and thus of power (Gasper 1993). “… this approach 
compels us to take a broad view of the ways in which access to food can be 
protected or promoted, including reforms of the legal framework within which 
economic relations take place” (Drèze & Sen 1989: 24). 
Characteristic of the entitlements approach is to distinguish many social 
groups, including not only in terms of income or economic class but also by 
occupation, gender, and more. Sen’s gender-differentiated study of intra-
household distribution led to dramatic analyses of differential mortality, 
highlighting tens of millions of “Missing Women” (Sen 1990b). It led also to 
his model of “cooperative conflicts” (Sen 2004a), which considers women’s 
situations within households and their possible strategies. Many researchers 
followed up this work on how women’s well-being depends on intra-
household negotiations that reflect how far they neglect their own well-being 
for the rest of the household, their degree of economic (in)dependence, the 
culturally-relative perceptions of what is a contribution, and how far they are 
subject to intimidation (Sen 1984, 2004a; Gasper 1993). 
This attention to social differentiation, beyond what had been normal in 
economics theory and practice, and to the institutionalized social norms that 
mould entitlements, gives channels for enriching economics with social theory. 
Claims and allocations are understood as arising within a society and polity, not 
only an economy (Gasper 2000). Sen’s capability approach and his theory of 
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reasoning add a greater agency-orientation, but within this awareness of social 
constraints. 
2.3 The capability approach – humanizing economics II 
Building on the study of who gets what, Sen has explored who can live (or die) 
how, with reference to what are the elements of human lives and what human 
meanings they carry. This work has potential for enriching social theory itself 
(Gangas 2020). Sen critiqued conventional welfare economics8 that is based on 
ideas of individual preferences and of their fulfilment through the holding of 
economic goods, and offered a reconstruction: including in his capability 
approach (CA) and associated re-conceptualizations of well-being, poverty, 
inequality (asking “Inequality of what?”), equity, and development (e.g., Sen 
1982, 1984, 2009). The CA recognises numerous determinants of well-being 
besides income or resources or formal rights and shows how misleading or 
insufficient each of those can therefore be as indicator, just as can felt 
satisfactions. It stresses, for example, variation across persons in ability to 
convert income or resources or formal rights into valued ‘functionings’ 
(meaning ‘beings and doings’), due to: 1. personal heterogeneities that give 
people different needs; 2. diversities in physical environment; 3. variations in 
social facilities (e.g., health systems, education systems, policing systems); and 
4. differences in norms and approved patterns of relating within a society.9 
Capability and entitlements analyses thus situate people as social actors 
who live in social structures with roles and constraints, and who are subject 
often to adaptive preferences and using over-narrow informational bases of 
judgement (Kremakova 2013). The ‘capability’ term was perhaps originally 
attached to ‘well-being freedom’, the extent of reasoningly valued life-
outcomes that a person can attain for herself (Sen 1985b: 13-14), related to the 
concerns in study of hunger; but the sister category of ‘agency freedom’ was 
also present, which refers more broadly to the extent that the person can fulfil 
her (reasoned) values, regardless of whom or what these address. ‘Well-being 
achievement’ and ‘agency achievement’ refer to the actual attainments. The 
whole approach continues though to be called ‘the capability approach’, and 
usage of ‘capability’ seems over time to have fully encompassed agency too; for 
example, the emergent term ‘capability for voice’ (ability to form and publicly 
express an opinion; Bonvin 2008) links strongly to most people’s conception 
of ‘agency’. 
 
8 Welfare economics: the concepts and theories in economics about when we can say 
that people and societies have become better or worse placed. 
9 Zimmerman (2018: 944) traces Sen’s derivation of the term ‘capability’ back to his 
reading of John Dewey (1859-1952), who distinguished a capacity (skill) to do 
something from a capability of doing so. Dewey noted that the latter depends also on 
the person’s environment (1891: 98). This might help to understand why Sen’s oft-
repeated list of sources of variation in capability across persons (i.e., of differential 
‘conversion factors’; Sen 1999a: 70-1, 88-90; 2009: 255; 2017a: 25) perhaps oddly 
excludes differences in skills despite his stress on agency.  
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The capability concept reflects a concern with reasoned freedom not only 
actual activities, and the importance of having both choices and effective 
power to attain desired outcomes (Zimmermann 2018). John Davis suggests 
that “the concept that ties his entire capability framework together—freedom 
(cf. especially Sen 1999a)—has no real equivalent in neoclassical and 
mainstream economics. In fact, his focus on freedom provides a normative 
framework alternative to efficiency analysis” (Davis 2003: 152). Sen has sought 
to recapture the potent ‘freedom’ concept, not leave it to Milton Friedman, 
Robert Nozick or Subramaniam Swamy. He expresses his conception as 
follows: 
[U]ltimately we have to see poverty as unfreedoms of various sorts: the lack of 
freedom to achieve even minimally satisfactory living conditions. Low income 
can certainly contribute to that, but so can a number of other influences, such as 
the lack of schools, absence of health facilities, unavailability of medicines, the 
subjugation of women, hazardous environmental features, lack of jobs 
(something that affects more than the earning of incomes). Poverty can be 
reduced through expanding these facilities, but in order to guarantee that, what is 
needed is an enhancement of the power of people, especially of the afflicted 
people, to make sure that the facilities are expanded and the deficiencies 
removed.  
People remain unempowered as a result of a variety of complex processes. ... 
Quiet acceptance – by the victims and by others – of the inability of a great many 
people to achieve minimally effective capabilities and to have basic substantive 
freedoms ... We have to see how the actions and inactions of a great many 
persons together lead to this social evil, ... [and how] the remedy too can come 
from the co-operative efforts of people at large.  ... ‘active citizenship’ can be a 
very effective way of seeking and securing solutions to these pervasive problems 
of powerlessness and unfreedom. (Sen 2012: ix-x).10 
 
Capability analysis thus brings attention to a wide range of values, for a 
differentiated variety of persons; indeed, in principle for each person, since 
each has to some extent a unique combination of circumstances and concerns. 
Further, it provides not only “a critical [evaluative] yardstick against which to 
assess the social world, its structuring principles and individual effects. As a 
descriptive concept broken down into a series of items suited for empirical 
inquiry – opportunities, resources, entitlements, conversion factors, 
achievements”, it structures a research programme “for an understanding of 
the mechanism[s] underpinning [or inhibiting] individual agency” 
(Zimmermann 2018: 942; my additions). These features lead Gangas (2014, 
2020) to argue that, for example, the concept of capability deprivation provides 
a more refined, flexible empirical research programme for understanding the 
multi-dimensional idea of ‘alienation’ than do the now overextended and 
 
10 Sen’s adoption here of the phrase ‘active citizenship’ follows the usage in the book 
he was introducing (Duncan Green’s ‘From Poverty to Power’). It is worth 
considering, though, whether here and often elsewhere Sen says more about the 
powerless than about powerholders and power-systems.  
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insufficiently specified usages of that term in contemporary sociological 
theories. 
Gangas argues similarly in relation to ‘agency’: “[CA] offers powerful 
concepts that can enable sociologists to rebuild the category of agency. … 
[For] the normative components of Sen’s notion of capabilities are not 
necessarily locked into an individualist approach to agency, typical of economic 
thought, but, rather, contain a social core that has been prefigured primarily by 
Parsons and to a lesser extent by Giddens” (Gangas 2020: 9). Giddens (1984) 
defined agency as the “capability to act”. Talcott Parsons stressed ‘capacity’ as 
central in his theory of action in society and as a condition for achieving real 
citizenship. His “vision of capacity, no matter how abstractly formulated, can 
be viably likened to the normative program of capabilities, aiming at a social 
self, free of major deprivations and sufferings” (Gangas 2016: 34). Gangas 
indicates how Sen’s description of agency goes further, for example through 
his attention to information availability and thus to how far agents can 
compare current arrangements with other possibilities and decide whether the 
arrangements may require amendment or rejection. “Sen’s idea of capability 
can render concrete the abstractions entailed in these two [viz., Parsons, 
Giddens] formulations of agency” (Gangas 2016: 33); partly because Sen 
focuses on specific issues such as morbidity, mortality, education, voting and 
employment, and provides more plentiful and more operational concepts for 
discussing what influences their occurrence. Many capability theorists have 
now explored agency much further, but the CA project can in turn be 
strengthened by connection to Parsons: to his exploration of the institutional 
infrastructures needed for personal capacity (Gangas 2020: 124) and his 
“mapping of the normative patterns which amplify [or inhibit] actors’ 
capabilities to choose the lifestyle(s) they have reason to value” (Gangas 2016: 
35; my addition).  
2.4 Democracy and the reasoning citizen – an ethics of 
politics and public life 
Lastly, Sen has been a theorist and champion of democracy in general and 
deliberative democracy in particular. His style has been in many ways more 
concrete, pragmatic and policy-relevant than, for example, that of Jürgen 
Habermas (Gangas 2020). Much of The Argumentative Indian (Sen 2005a) is 
about ‘voice’, Albert Hirschman (1970)’s more political partner-notion to 
‘agency’. Voice reinforces and relies on agency. The empowered active citizen 
demands, negotiates and helps to construct effective entitlements.  
Connected to his picture of public reasoning is an advocacy of how 
participants in public arenas should see themselves. Compared to the 
conceptualization of identity as unity-in-diversity, favoured by for example 
Nehru, Sen (2006) has advanced a related but different framework, to advocate 
a person’s recognition of his/her plural affiliations plus a reasoned 
individuality. It reflects a strong liberal insistence on seeing people as “persons 
with the ‘capacity to act and the freedom to choose,’ [DG: including in respect 
to their self-description,] rather than being reduced to simplified categories, 
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such as [only] workers, unemployed, mothers, etc. (e.g. Sen 1999a: 295-296)” 
(Kremakova 2013: 398). 
In later sections I will comment on Sen’s work in the last two of the fields 
that have now been introduced: the capability approach and democracy.11  
There is already much secondary literature on that work, so before essaying 
further commentary let us look at some matters that have been less extensively 
discussed, regarding his intellectual style in approaching social theorizing. Sen 
is, simultaneously, a wide-ranging economic theorist, practical policy analyst, an 
incisive analytical philosopher who is profoundly aware of the imperfections of 
analytical schema, and a learned cultural and intellectual historian and observer 
of India. The attempt to characterize his intellectual style will, I hope, help the 
later comments to go deeper.  
 
11 Since some pieces already discuss Sen’s preoccupation with freedom (e.g., Gasper 
2002, 2007a, Gasper & van Staveren 2003), I here explore other aspects and treat that 
preoccupation instead via its embodiment in the capability approach. 
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3  Sen’s approach – some characteristics 
Some of Sen’s traits are those of the skilled economist, such as an orientation 
to making wide-ranging comparisons and to tracing unforeseen effects.12 His 
sustained comparisons between India and China, between different regions in 
India and China, and between India or Indian regions and Bangladesh, step 
outside a myopic national frame. Less standard amongst economists and 
philosophers are his effective balancing of theorization, investigation of cases, 
and the practical requirements of policy analysis. He examines vivid real cases 
in depth, like communal violence and the 1940s Bengal Famine in which 
millions died while food was available, to engage readers and colleagues, 
inform thought and build more realistic theory and policy analyses. Most 
distinctive though, and perhaps hardly surpassed amongst social scientists, are 
the skills he brings as an analytical philosopher, combined yet with a strong 
humanistic and literary sensitivity. 
3.1 Dissector of concepts  
Sen’s work, in field after field, nearly always involves patient and incisive 
conceptual examination. His priority to conceptual clarification does not 
involve stipulative simplifications. He often stresses the limits of attempted 
formal definitions and the need to recognise irremovable degrees of ambiguity. 
He endorses, for example, Paul Farmer’s procedure (2005) of ostensive 
definition of power, social structures and violence, relying on multiple 
illustrations more than explicit verbal specification.  
Besides his famous demonstrations of the complexity of some notions in 
political philosophy like ‘equality’ and ‘freedom’ (e.g., Sen 1982, 2009), The 
Argumentative Indian (2005a) dissects many significant terms in social theory, 
including ‘modernity’, ‘secularism’, ‘Hinduism’, ‘India’, and ‘the world’; and 
also ‘identity’, which he pursues at greater length in Identity and Violence (2006). 
The concept ‘modernity’ is shown to be highly multidimensional and with no 
obvious simple meaning (Sen 2005a: 313); correspondingly, talk on ‘post-
modernity’ is often confused and opportunistic. The concept ‘secularism’ 
means non-discrimination between religions but has very diverse variants 
according to the degree of closeness or distance, support or indifference, given 
equally to religions by a State. Ashish Nandy’s anti-secularism arguments 
struggle under such examination (Sen 2005a, Ch.14).  
Against any reductionist picture of ‘the’ Hindu tradition, Sen presents its 
enormous variations, heterogeneity, and recency as a category (2005a: 310). He 
cites the conception of “the basic Hindu approach” (Sen 2005a: 46) in a 
standard book by his grandfather (K.M. Sen 1961) but that conception was the 
 
12 E.g., the discussion of “friendly fire” in Sen’s “Class in India” (2005a, Ch.10), on 
how schemes intended/declared to help the poor frequently ignore the real poor and 
may even worsen their situation. 
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opposite of reductionist; it emphasised “an overarching liberality” (Sen 2005a: 
46), catholicity and acceptance of heterodoxy (p.12). He contrasts this with 
“the drastically down-sized Hinduism that tends to receive the patronage of 
the Hindutva movement” (p.74). 
The concept of ‘India’ receives a similar analysis, given the huge variations 
within Indian thinking, society and culture. Sen distinguishes India and 
Hinduism – India is older than Hinduism and Hinduism comes substantially 
from outside India (2005a: 66). Further, within India ‘Hindu’ and ‘Muslim’ 
cultures are profoundly overlapping and interpenetrated (pp. 315-6), and 
cultures are far more than only their religious strands. So he rejects “The 
Smallness Thrust Upon Us” (Sen 2015, Ch.3) in both the small picture of India 
as overwhelmingly Hindu and the small picture of Hinduism (2005a: 83). 
Instead, India is seen, as by Tagore or Nehru, as a confluence of many 
religions and streams (p.118). 
Likewise, in conceptualising the world, Sen suggests the fatuity and danger 
of Samuel Huntington (1996)’s partition of humanity into eight ‘civilizations’ 
that are presumed to be (i) primarily defined by religious tradition, (ii) 
fundamentally different, (iii) mutually antagonistic and (iv) unable to effectively 
communicate and co-deliberate (2005a: Chs. 8, 13). Huntington’s inadequate 
approach to societies links, Sen considers, to an inadequate approach to 
conceptualizing persons. 
3.2 Deconstructor/reconstructor of the person and personal 
identities 
Sen has deconstructed the economics notion of the rational individual and 
distinguished as we saw between self-interest, ‘sympathy’ (enjoyment from the 
welfare of others), and ‘commitment’ (valuing that welfare despite not gaining 
enjoyment from it; Sen 1982, 1984), often as a part of sharing group 
memberships. He added awareness of plurality within the self, including 
through the idea of metapreferences: preferences about preferences.13 This idea 
involves not merely a further sort of preference, but a move beyond 
considering preferences as exogenous. Instead, people have some capacity to 
reflect on, reason about, assess and modify their preferences (Davis 2007). 
Davis links this picture, of persons as reasoners about preferences, to Sen’s 
view of people as reasoners about their various actual/potential elements of 
social affiliation and identity; and connects that in turn to Sen’s concept of 
‘commitment’, “an act in which individuals freely self-constrain themselves to 
others” (Davis 2007: 329). 
Sen does not, according to Davis (2003: 66), go further to think about the 
different mental frames and ‘utility functions’ corresponding to a person’s 
different social roles; but he explicitly rejects economics’ frequent “identity 
disregard”, the presumption that people are purely individuals with 
independently given preferences and have no “sense of identity with anyone 
 
13 For example, a preference to not have one’s preference for smoking. 
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other than themselves” or give little attention to it (Sen 2006: 20). Besides the 
common economics picture of unsocialized individuals, he rejects also an 
overemphatically sociological picture of totally socialized individuals who bear 
a single socially given identity. Varieties of communitarian thought where 
people are supposedly members of just one basic group (2006: 177) have 
frequently been disastrously reductionist. 
In Identity and Violence (2006) Sen argues against classification of people 
primarily, even exclusively, in terms of a single social identity, whether within a 
country or across countries, say as ‘Hindu’ or ‘Indian’. He calls such a picture 
of “singular affiliation” (p.20) the “solitarist illusion” (p.82), namely the 
“illusion of a unique and choiceless identity” (p.xv). It is fallacious for many 
reasons: including that cultures are not monolithic and that people exist as 
intersections of many cultural streams. Huntington-style identification in terms 
of religious tradition downgrades non-religious aspects of identity, as the 
British did in India. Such classification is dangerous as well as wrong; for each 
stipulated group it hands power to a particular elite that claims, seizes or is 
given authority over all supposed members of the supposed religious 
community.  
The prevailing characterisations of Huntington-esque supposed 
civilisational package-deals (e.g., equating ‘Europe’ or ‘the West’ to democracy) 
are often laughably ignorant and racist (Sen 2006, Ch.3). Democracy is not 
specific to Europe, nor predominant in European history; nor has Europe only 
given and not received in this respect. Unfortunately, dichotomisation is 
sometimes sustained also by post-colonial reactivity in the self-
characterisations in the South/East, that affirm ‘we are fundamentally 
different’ from the North/West (2006, Ch.5). The future of global cooperation 
relies on our not seeing people in such simplistic identity-boxes, but instead on 
our recognising multiple commonalities. “Culture, after all, is more than mere 
geography” (2004b: 55) or than religion alone.  
There is no single proper way of grouping people, since we have multiple 
relevant characteristics, and deciding which ones are most relevant in a specific 
context must be reasoned out in that context. One senses that Sen learns here 
from his own complex geographical and intellectual life-trajectory. Such 
reasoning and choice are central in leading a human life (2006: xiii), for 
considering what are one’s relevant identities and in weighing them (pp. 24, 
38). We do not merely ‘recognise’ who we are, for notwithstanding our cultural 
inheritances we have choices in self-identification (pp. 30, 35-6). Similarly, a 
real multiculturalism is more than merely the coexistence of several fixed 
monoculturalisms (p.156). It involves people’s cultural freedom, ability to learn 
and select from multiple cultures, make reasoned informed choices (pp. 114, 
150), and live examined lives (p.160)  
The Argumentative Indian (2005a) applies such arguments specifically to 
India. It objects to the predominant classification of people by primarily just 
one dimension, say their recorded religion (Hindu/Moslem/…), especially 
when done regardless of whether the people classified as say Hindu profess 
Hinduism or give it definitional priority. After people are counted as Hindus 
using one definition of Hinduism (i.e., what was stated on a birth certificate), 
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this is used to define a supposed “community” (p.53); and then, further, a 
Hindutva government may act as if all those who were so counted support a 
different specification of Hinduism which includes many beliefs that are far 
from unanimously shared (pp. 354-5).  
Sen calls for people to be able to categorize themselves rather than be 
pigeonholed from birth (2005a: 55). For we are not bacteria or ants, near-
identical programmed ‘robots’. He admits that choice of identity is constrained 
but insists that virtually all people have significant degrees of choice (2005a: 
351); and that the reflective choice of which aspects of one’s plural identity to 
highlight in a particular context is a key aspect of human freedom. He holds 
that failure to understand this plurality and responsibility is a major cause of 
conflicts. What many people and some communitarian theorists consider 
authenticity Sen identifies as failure. His phrase regarding India, that “in our 
heterogeneity and in our openness lies our pride, not our disgrace” (Sen 2005a: 
138), applies also to within each person, as well as to scientific endeavours. 
“Community membership is taken as instrumental, not central, to being” 
(Gasper 2002: 452). 
Sen presents the choices by individuals in characterizing themselves, in the 
same fashion as he presents choices by analysts in categorizing persons—as an 
exercise in philosophical reflection. Yet if many of the different relevant 
components of identity come as social memberships, then they come with 
social expectations and pressures and as outcomes of socialization. As we will 
discuss later, his picture of self-characterizing individuals may sometimes be 
more programmatic than descriptive, an exercise also in liberal assertion. To 
Gangas (2020: 22), Sen like Nussbaum considers “pluralism [as] both an 
irreducible aspect of reality and, as it turns out, a value.” 
3.3 Explorer of complexity, heterogeneity, diversity, 
intersectionality – and advocate of liberal hope 
Sen’s insistence on complex conceptualisation leads to stresses on 
heterogeneity, diversity, intersectionality, and on “description as choice” (Sen 
1982, Ch.20). We saw that entitlements analysis and capability analysis look not 
at ‘the social actor/subject’ or even ‘the worker’/’the peasant’ but at multi-
dimensional real people: gendered, having particular ages and professions and 
histories and (dis)abilities. Sen insists on using multiple descriptive and 
explanatory dimensions in analysing a society and rejects preoccupation with 
say economic class alone (2005a: Ch.10, “Class in India”). He characteristically 
carefully assesses correlations and interconnections between dimensions of 
disadvantage but considers them insufficiently strong and invariable to justify 
focus on just one dimension like class. Instead he proposes and undertakes 
intersectional study of how diverse factors operate jointly, not in isolation (for 
example, the composite action of caste, religion and class; ibid.).  
He stresses the inevitable choices involved in making descriptions of 
complex multi-dimensional realities. His notions of ‘positional objectivity’ and 
‘description as choice’ match ideas in pragmatist epistemology and from frame 
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theory in cognitive psychology. Positional objectivity, we noted, means that 
from different viewing positions people see differently; description-as-choice 
reflects that we have choices too in categorisation and about what to include. 
For example, Sen does not present his emphasis on argumentation and  
reasoning in Indian history as the only correct picture; instead he appears to 
consciously emphasise this strand because it has been neglected (in part due to 
British imperial dominance and its manufacture of reductive stereotypes about 
India) and because it contributes to a basis for peaceful progress, democracy 
and secularism (2005a: Preface).  
Elsewhere he claims more, though, that “the Indian subcontinent has a 
particularly strong tradition in recognizing and pursuing a dialogic 
commitment” (2005a: 75), and highlights for example how Buddhism gave 
“special importance to discussions and dialogue” (p.81). Both propositions 
seem somewhat strained, as if Ashoka and Akbar were typical and as if their 
approaches had prevailed in India. Again and again, in many publications, he 
returns to the record of Buddhism in India, for its general rationalist 
commitment, and especially to Ashoka and the ordered open debates in three 
ancient councils held to discuss Buddhist doctrine (e.g. 2005a: Ch.8). He refers 
to these councils, held about one per century (in the 5th, 4th and 3rd centuries 
BC; no agreed historical details have been established), as if they constituted a 
tradition of public reasoning. It illustrates a further characteristic in his work, 
that we may call (to use a phrase from his friend, and uncle by marriage, Albert 
Hirschman) “a bias for hope” (Hirschman 1971). 
 Sen stresses agency as well as structure. He readily accepts Marx’s 
formulation in ‘The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon’: "Men make 
their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it 
under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, 
given and transmitted from the past." But he adds a strong liberal idealist 
imprint.  
Not everyone has Sen’s appetite for conceptual clarification and epistemic 
refinement. Hence not only is his type of social analysis at risk of being a 
minority pursuit, but the types of people that we need to theorize about 
include many who are probably somewhat different from those he focuses on. 
His chosen description seems to reflect a normative vision.  
3.4 Public intellectual and gentle persuader 
Sen’s argumentative style matches his ideal of government by reasoned 
deliberation: courteous, patient, systematic, interactive.14 He works as a 
diplomatic reformer from inside. I have suggested elsewhere that this 
“preference for gentle persuasion [is] seen in adoption of evocative but 
ambiguous, politically safe labels and an avoidance of seeking debate on all 
fronts (e.g. against hyper affluence)” (Gasper 2000: 989). His key terms— 
 
14 Gopalkrishna Gandhi’s exploration of Sen’s style calls it “marsupial” (Gandhi 2015: 
xvi)—always containing pockets for qualifications and refinements. 
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‘freedom’, ‘capability’, ‘agency’, ‘entitlement’—are memorable, widely 
appealing, and adapted from the societal mainstream; but relatedly, the labels 
have quite often induced confusions.15  
The wide scope, evocative concepts and affable manner have helped Sen’s 
work to interest a remarkable range of readers across the social sciences as well 
as wider publics and many policy agencies, national and international (such as 
the UK’s Equality and Human Rights Commission and Government Equalities 
Office, and various corners in the UN and EU systems). Iguiñiz (2002) finds 
strong commonalities between Development as Freedom and Gustavo Gutierrez’s 
A Theology of Liberation (1973), while others have remarked on Sen’s relative 
avoidance of ‘liberation’ or ‘empowerment’ language despite his insistence that 
development is a process of extending freedoms (e.g., Hill 2003). “The choice 
of the imprecise but attractive and politically safe term ‘freedom’ illustrates a 
sustained style: cautious boldness, seeking a wide, mainstream audience with 
terms, tones and topics that will appeal [to] and engage them” (Gasper 2000: 
996). Sen has stayed away from strong criticism of opulence and commodity-
addiction, perhaps partly because his greatest focus has been on addressing 
absolute poverty in India; and he does not wish within Indian debates to be 
typecast and politically marginalized as anti-growth (see Sen 2015: xliii). Nor 
does he focus on picking out “bad guys” responsible for social ills.16 Strongly 
aware of the centrality of mass education and the significance of its neglect in 
both colonial and democratic India, the closest he comes to class-based 
criticism is to ascribe this neglect to the British imperial legacy, the 
continuation of traditional Indian elitism, and “Upper-class-dominated 
contemporary politics” (2005a: 116). More usually he identifies bad ideas as the 
“bad guys” and expresses a Millian faith in education and in “government by 
discussion” (Duncan 1973; Gasper 2009).  
 
15 For ‘entitlements’, for example, see Gasper (1993): “patterns of rights and 
claims…are complex and vary over time and place, [so] the [entitlements analysis] 
terms and formats irresistibly evolve beyond Sen’s” (p. 698). For ‘freedom’, see 
Gasper (2009).  
16 His essay on Satyajit Ray admires how Ray’s films eschewed simple identifications 
of heroes and villains (Sen 2005a, Ch.6). 
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4  Sen and social theory – possible limitations and some 
responses 
4.1 Sen’s relationship to sociology and anthropology 
“[T]he capability approach has remained largely unnoticed by sociologists”, 
suggested Kremakova (2013: 394). Several other authors have commented on 
lack of reference by sociologists to Sen’s work; for example Venkataraman 
(2016) specifically for India. The same may apply amongst anthropologists, 
with Arjun Appadurai as one exception. As partial explanation, Holmwood 
noted weakness of the reverse connection too: Sen “makes very few references 
to sociological research despite it having clear relevance to his interests” (2013: 
1171). Even his books on sociological topics (2005a, 2006, 2015) include little 
reference to sociologists or other social theorists.17 When he recognises social 
coordination through norms, as emphasised “in the sociological and 
anthropological literature” (Sen 2009: 203)—in contrast to through contracts 
as emphasised in economics and some philosophy—he does not cite any such 
literature; the only reference is to a political scientist, winner of an economics 
Nobel Prize, Elinor Ostrom. 
Holmwood goes on: “Sen construes sociology as a…supplier of empirical 
instances to illustrate the argument about capabilities (for example, concerning 
issues of gender, or disability, as they bear on access to, and distribution of, 
‘commodities’ necessary to realise capabilities)” (2013: 1176); he does not 
engage sociological theory. So, for example, while “the sociological argument 
that had the greatest resonance with the research programme being developed 
by Sen was that of T.H. Marshall [of LSE] and his discussion of social rights of 
citizenship” (p.1178), Sen never refers to him. The relative lack of interest in 
Sen from sociologists might also reflect, Holmwood suggests, their heavy 
preoccupation with economic class. That has led often to relatively low focus 
(unlike in the social policy field) on the wide variety and diverse incidence of 
social inequalities that Sen investigates. 
Hartley Dean, himself professor of social policy at LSE, spoke though for 
many readers when assessing the capability approach and Sen’s work more 
widely: “[Capability] is essentially a liberal-individualist concept. Despite its 
attractions…the `capability approach' obscures or neglects three key realities: 
[1] the constitutive nature of human interdependency; [2] the problematic 
nature of the public realm; and [3] the exploitative nature of capitalism. … [An] 
emancipatory politics of needs interpretation…would be better served by a 
discourse of rights than a discourse of capabilities.” (2009: 261). He adds: “It is 
 
17 See, e.g., their indexes. Slightly more frequently mentioned in The Argumentative 
Indian are a few social scientists whom Sen criticises, such as Ashish Nandy from 
social psychology and Samuel Huntington from political science. His papers on social 
exclusion (Sen 2000) and culture in development (Sen 2004b) are wider-ranging but 
still oriented more to institutional economics than to ‘social theory’. 
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not simply that it is possible for official national and international agencies to [as 
one can observe] adopt the language of capabilities while studiously ignoring 
key drivers of inequality and poverty. For all its attractions, the concept is in 
itself constrained” (p.266; emphases in the original).18 
In contrast to Dean, various sociologists and other social scientists argue 
that Sen’s capability thinking provides helpful tools in explanation as well as 
for normative purposes, although it indeed “must be complemented with 
theories that enable a better understanding of social structure, human sociality, 
collective living and the meaning of social action, for example within the 
philosophical traditions of Hannah Arendt and Paul Ricoeur” (Kremakova 
2013: 413, referring especially to Deneulin et al. 2006). Further, many have 
initiated this work of partnering. The capability approach is flexible and 
evolves, as surveyed recently in for example Gangas’s book on Sen and 
sociological theory (2020). Gangas agrees on “the marked omission of 
sociology in core principles of CA” (Gangas 2020: 7) and warns that 
continuation of “the persistent repulsion of sociological theory” (p.13) could 
leave CA in a dead-end. But he believes the limitations are remediable and 
worth remedying, for CA’s conceptual system expresses a concern with 
purposeful, just, flourishing human lives and can help to motivate, focus and 
complement existing sociological theorizing. 
Some of Dean’s arguments carry weight; some reflect misunderstandings 
or concern gaps that can be filled. Regarding human interdependency, Dean 
remarks that “the capability approach to equality is framed in terms of 
freedom, but not solidarity. … the freedom to choose, not the need to belong” 
(2009: 267). He suggests that this gives an inadequate understanding of human 
living. Being, for humans, is constituted by and critically reliant on 
dependencies, support by others, not only freedoms; humans are vulnerable 
and needy, not only autonomous agents. Our affiliations to and dependence on 
others are not merely a route to our own capabilities but “are constitutive of 
our individual identities and the frameworks of meaning by which we value 
various functionings” (2009: 268).19 
Recognition of needs to belong is indeed fuller in the work of Nussbaum, 
who highlights affiliation as central, than in Sen’s. His use of freedoms 
language can become overextended (Gasper & van Staveren 2003), but by 
freedoms he explicitly means capabilities to achieve (reasoned) values, which 
will certainly include numerous affiliations. Nor does he have anything against 
freedoms which arise from dependencies.20 His theory of identity highlights the 
 
18 One may note though that, whether they use a language of capabilities or human 
rights or any other, official agencies are always multiply constrained. 
19 Dean remarks that we require a relational ontology of personhood. See, e.g., Gasper 
& Truong (2010) on how personal autonomy arises out of mutual relations of care. 
20 Holmwood notes that whereas “[for] most liberal writers, the appropriate question 
is whether institutions appropriately express theoretically established principles of 
individualism, …for Sen [instead] the issue is whether institutions allow the 
flourishing of individuals” (2013: 1176). Both institutions and dependencies are 
essential; the question is, of what sorts and with what results. 
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multiplicity of our affiliations, but argues that these should be open to 
reasoned review; and he is aware also of dangers that can arise from the pursuit 
of needs to belong, including from stereotyping, excluding and victimizing 
those who are deemed not to belong. He argues that the “presence of 
individuals who think, choose, and act does not make an approach 
methodologically individualist; rather, the postulation that the individuals are 
separated and detached from each other would do that” (Sen 2002: 81). He 
makes no such postulation, and instead explores many forms of 
interconnection.  
Dean observes further that “our ability at any particular moment to 
function as we choose may necessarily be achieved at the expense of others' 
freedom” (2009: 273). This is true, but the equivalent applies also for fulfilment 
of the need to belong. Every value may conflict sometimes with other values, 
or with the same value as enjoyed by other people. Sen never proposes that 
freedoms cannot conflict or that they are the only type of value. The criticisms 
by Dean regarding capitalism and the public realm do, however, have more 
strength. 
4.2 Links and limitations – and opportunities – in relation 
to social theory  
We noted that Sen’s foremost intellectual formation was in ‘social choice 
theory’, which despite its name contains little social theory; it is a branch of 
choice-theory. He has an economist’s strong emphases on choice and agency; 
at the same time his work has always been critical of the simplistic picture of 
persons in much of economics and politics. So, how far does he consider 
human sociality, social structure, and people’s socially derived mental 
programming and cognitive and emotional constraints, and what potentials 
exist then for cooperation with sociologists? 
We can better describe a presumed separation and detachment of persons 
from each other as ‘ontological individualism’ and reserve the term 
‘methodological individualism’ for analysing from the perspective of 
individuals. A different line of criticism of individual-centred theorizing may 
concern then not an alleged lack of awareness of the centrality of affiliations 
and belonging, but instead an exclusive or excessive reliance on 
methodological individualism in the sense just mentioned. Gangas, for 
example, suggests that “although Sen’s version of CA offers a promising 
renewal of the ‘embeddedness’ argument (Polanyi) its methodological 
approach over-relies on economics and thus lacks fine-tuning to sociology and 
in particular to theoretical models that address the problem of market 
embeddedness in society” (2020: 8). Holmwood concurs. He suggests that Sen 
has much more influence in analytical philosophy and political science because 
these disciplines are, like economics, more methodologically individualist than 
is sociology. Thus we see many PPE degree programmes, very few PPS; and 
some “welfare economists and social choice theorists have been influential in 
forming...a kind of social science that was unsympathetic to sociology” 
(Holmwood 2013: 1173). Sen shares the ideal and preoccupation of Condorcet, 
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the reasoning society, able to change its behaviour, as opposed to what he 
considers a Malthusian notion of animal-type societies bound by fixed laws of 
motion (Sen 2009: 112; and 2017a: Ch. A6). Holmwood proposes though that 
“[his] approach to markets is similar to that of [the economic sociologist] 
Polanyi and we might regard the idea of capabilities as giving substance to the 
latter’s idea of ‘complex freedom’” (Holmwood 2013: 1183). 
As Kremakova notes (2013: 399), besides people’s range of affiliations Sen 
is well-aware of various (other) social influences, interactions, negotiations and 
constraints. Entitlements analysis and capability theory consider many in detail. 
Let us unpack ‘social constraints’, to consider how far this work moves beyond 
ontological or even methodological individualism. Enthusiasts for Sen’s 
language of freedom and agency are often weak in their attention to social 
structures, argues Andrew Sayer amongst others (e.g., Deneulin 2006). He warns 
that “[CA’s] radical implications are mostly being missed, largely on account of 
attempts to use its normative theory without an adequate account of the social 
structures that enable or limit human capabilities in particular situations”; CA 
has been typically combined with “inadequate theories of society, particularly 
regarding the external conditions enabling or limiting capabilities” (Sayer 2012: 
580). Gangas remarks in a similar vein that CA “says very little about role 
placements and role dispositions” (2016: 114; italics added) and about the institutional 
configurations required to sustain fulfilment of priority capabilities and 
functionings. Sen (1999a) writes of a series of essential ‘instrumental freedoms’ 
but without, unlike Parsons and many sociologists, much depth on the 
institutions that might sustainably support them. The great Indian socio-
economist C.T. Kurien contrasted his own careful specification of institutional 
context, as a precondition for realistic economic theorizing, with Sen’s more 
abstracted approach. Sen defends ‘‘[a] general approach [that] can be used in 
many different ways, depending on the context and the information that is 
available. It is this combination of foundational analysis and pragmatic use that 
gives the capability [and entitlements] approach its extensive reach’’ (Sen 
1999a: 86; my addition). His case studies of hunger and food policy, for 
example, contain far more institutional specification than does his broad 
theorizing. Lastly, many authors (e.g., Deneulin 2006) note that collective actors 
rather than individuals are essential in attempts to change or counteract social 
structures, including norms and roles. Sayer, Gangas, and Deneulin et al. all 
suggest though, unlike Dean, that these common gaps or weaknesses in use of 
CA are remediable and being remedied. 
More attention is given in CA to the social influencing of preferences, 
including some attention to unconscious internalization of social norms, an easy 
step to make beyond ‘adaptive preference’. Gangas sees in The Idea of Justice 
(2009) some move towards Durkheim’s “response to the Hobbesian problem 
of order. [Recognition of the] force of [collective] affective sentiments …the 
normative glue of the collective, beyond the functional and utilitarian 
justifications for human interdependence” (2020: 198). The distance between 
CA and sociology has perhaps been greater in respect to formation of social 
capabilities, embodied in or promoted by institutions and traditions. Some of 
these overlap with what van Staveren (2001) calls ‘moral capabilities’ of 
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persons: to be able to interact with others, to form purposes and commit to 
and act on these, and to balance incommensurable values. Sagovsky (2006) 
warned that CA has been weak here. Some work has appeared, however, such 
as by Nussbaum (2001, 2013). 
A further possible area of relative current CA weakness concerns 
insufficient “treatment of the social construction of meaning” more broadly, the 
meaning systems which people absorb and which form them as people 
(Kremakova 2013: 404; italics added; cf. also Salais 2009). Gangas suggests that 
Sen sometimes resists such a focus. He fears oversimplification and 
stereotyping of ‘cultures’, and emphasises rather that people can and do make 
their own constructions of value and identity (see, e.g., Sen 2004b). Bonvin and 
Laruffa (2018) respond too, perhaps slightly off the point, by noting Sen’s 
interest in the social emergence of public purposes. His reasons for democracy 
include not only its inherent worth and instrumental roles (it mobilizes 
information and provides pressures to respect the interests of each participant), 
but its promotion of social learning about one’s fellows and of formation of 
shared purposes (Sen 1999b). People can rise above their limited positional 
objectivity.21 Salais (2009) argues that a social choice theory approach to public 
reasoning has lacked but needs a notion of common good. This could help to 
extend Sen’s notion of ‘commitment’, to clearly cover also Smith’s ‘public 
spirit’ and to apply in all groups within which one is interconnected.  
So, more relevant than claiming that all requirements are already fulfilled 
within Sen’s indeed voluminous corpus, is the response by authors like 
Caroline Hart (2013, 2019). For her work on aspirations and education Hart 
combined CA with Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus, fields of interaction and 
multiple forms of capital (social, cultural, symbolic, as well as economic) that 
affect the attainment of capabilities and functionings. Sen provided her with 
tools to consider a wide range of human capacities and outcomes; Bourdieu 
provided tools to investigate the social contexts and processes in accessing and 
progressing in higher education. Ideas of habitus allowed discussion of social 
formation of the person, including of subconscious assumptions, in her studies 
on emergence and application of expectations and aspirations and hence of 
capabilities. Sen is himself clear that he does not offer a total theory and that 
his ideas can be combined with and enriched by other perspectives. 
4.3  A programmatic conception of the person 
Writing before Sen’s 2005 and 2006 books, Davis thought: “Sen does not 
actually have a theory of the individual” (2003: 164; emphasis in the original), 
neither a theory of the social formation of individuals nor a theory of how 
individuals can be/become independent choosers despite being to a major 
extent socially embedded. Mary Douglas claimed that Sen adopted a picture 
 
21 Bonvin & Laruffa (2018) argue that the ideas of description-as-choice and 
positional-objectivity readily lead on to an awareness of social construction of 




“that wants emanate from individuals and that basically individuals are the 
same the world over” (Douglas et al. 1998: 228). Maniar asserts somewhat 
similarly that the “Capabilities Approach assumes that subjectivities are already 
formed and need to be responded to” (2019: 9).22  
Even so, commentators had noted that “we find much relevant 
qualification and elaboration already in Sen; and that the capability approach 
lends itself to enrichment from work with deeper analyses of agency” (Gasper 
2000: 998). Sen remarked for example that many women imbibe masculinist 
ideology and are even the proximate drivers for female feticide (e.g., 2005a: 
239-40). They thus need more than only schooling and access to employment. 
Using terms from Len Doyal and Ian Gough, we can say that besides autonomy 
of agency, ability to act independently, people need ability to think independently 
(Sen 2005a: 239) – critical autonomy (Gough 2014). Sen’s own definition of 
agency as “the pursuit of goals and objectives that a person has reason to value 
and advance” (2005a: 221) does not exclude critical autonomy but is less clear. 
Since Davis’s comment above in 2003, Sen has continued his elaborations, 
making explicit what he had in mind;23 and other authors have suggested 
extensions. We saw that Gangas considers that a compatible framing for Sen’s 
ideas is Parsons’ theory of “the action system and its normative ideal of 
‘institutionalized individualism’” (2016: 30).24 Sen’s elaborations, while 
considerable, do not remove the need for such extensions. He has, for 
example, written further on his admiration for Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, showing that he aims for a social not asocial psychology. As 
Holmwood (2013) remarks, however, there is more to be said in social 
psychology now than Adam Smith could. Smith looked especially at the 
individual, thinking about others and mutual relations, rather less than at the 
whole social moulding and constraining of the person. We need, continues 
Holmwood, “the idea of a social self that overcomes the dualism of 
instrumental and value-rational action…that otherwise dominate[s]… 
contemporary economics and sociology” (2013: 1182). He acknowledges that 
Sen addresses both sides of this Weberian duality, between behaviour that aims 
to do whatever maximizes achievement of given objectives and behaviour that 
instead follows given fixed valued forms; in fact, Sen (2009) is explicit on the 
limitations of that dualism. 
Davis’s own proposed enrichment is “that having a personal identity is 
having a capability, … being able to not be lost in different social relationships 
is a matter of having capability to move across them and maintain one’s sense 
of self.  What is needed is not only that one remains a distinct individual (my 
individuation criterion) but remains one across changing circumstances (my 
reidentification criterion)” (personal communication, 2 September 2020). 
Indeed: “the entire capabilities-as-freedoms framework depends on the one 
 
22 For other discussions of the limited conception of personhood in Sen’s writings 
through 1999, see e.g. Gasper (2002), Gasper & van Staveren (2003). 
23 See e.g. remarks already in his 1988 interview with Richard Swedberg (Sen 1990: 
260), on personal identity as a plurality of memberships. 
24 Citing Parsons & Smelser (1956: 49). 
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central freedom or capability of being able to sustain a personal identity” 
(Davis 2007: 331). More fully:  
If individuals…are enmeshed in countless cross-cutting social group 
relationships, one way we may understand individual freedom is in terms of their 
being able to move back and forth comfortably across these relationships… [in 
other words, to not be] fragmented and lost amid these relationships, 
but…sustain an individual identity across them. Sen’s idea [is] that individuals 
develop their capabilities by exercising a freedom to explore possibilities in life… 
Agency freedom…can accordingly be thought central to understanding the 
personal identity of socially embedded individuals. [The ability to investigate, 
span and balance/reconcile their multiple relationships] would identify them as 
independent individuals. (Davis 2003: 179; my expansion) 
Sen’s more recent work emphasises a similar view.25 Thus a few years later 
Davis could write: “Sen claims that individuals are able to make first-person 
reflexive representations of themselves to counter others’ third-person 
representations of them” (2010: 174). The model of personhood in Sen’s 2005 
and 2006 books is ambitious. In it, people are reflexive and thoughtful about 
everything, including about which group affiliations and identities they might 
accept and combine. He says people can or should be able to say who they are, 
choosing-cum-composing their own identity out of their multitude of 
characteristics, affiliations, ideals and loyalties. Their distinctiveness as persons 
arises precisely out of this reflective mix-and-match-ing. Is this conception of 
personal identity presented as descriptive as well as normative/programmatic? 
In the essay “The Smallness Thrust Upon Us” Sen writes that in “determining 
the relative importance of [our] diverse diversities, and…understanding the 
priorities between them… [t]hese choices cannot be settled—as some 
communitarians have claimed—as a matter of passive ‘discovery’” (2015: 45). 
Is the “cannot” here descriptive as well as normative? For many, even most, 
people in most of history and possibly continuing nowadays, the independent 
sense of self may not be or have been strong enough for Sen’s vision to serve 
as a general description. Certain given identities are declared as unavoidable 
and overriding. Nationalist affirmations, for example, are not in decline; and 
the notion that markets transform or divert these or other sectarian passions 
into mere interests or options that people calmly reason about does not appear 
confirmed by experience. 
Sen persuasively advocates a ‘large India’ conception, that does not neglect 
Buddha, Ashoka, Kabir, Nanak and Akbar, above a ‘small India’ notion that 
could stress only Rama (Sen 2005a: 75). He presents the ‘small India’ notion as 
an inferior chosen description, a neglect of relevant information.26 But he does 
not enter the minds of those who cling to ‘small India’. Similarly, his incisive 
dissection of conceptual oversimplifications in discussions of secularism is not 
an existential investigation of the angers, fears, lived experiences and social 
 
25 Whereas Davis engages in depth with social theories (notably, about collective 
intentionality) in order to do so, Sen does not. His work is supplemented by Davis’s. 




manipulation that may drive Indian anti-secularism.27 Will self-definition and 
drawing on multiple cultural strands prosper in many environments? Sen 
replies that numerous people throughout recorded history, and certainly 
nowadays, have evidently been busy with their own self-definition, for 
otherwise there would be no “need for the policing of adherence and loyalty, 
which is typically so active in communitarian activism” (2015: 50). And the 
growth of such self-definition is a central feature, both descriptively and 
normatively, of ‘development’ (2015: 51). Indeed, his slogan ‘development as 
freedom’ can refer as much or more to this theme of self-definition than to 
questions of economic choice or political democracy. 
4.4 On power and capitalism 
Sen does sometimes discuss power, rarely power-systems (Hill 2003). He is 
shrewdly critical of the quasi-religious vacuity in ideas of ‘dictatorship of the 
proletariat’ and of similar utopian proposals which do not find ‘countervailing 
powers’ necessary (Sen 2019). In his Foreword to Paul Farmer’s Pathologies of 
Power, he approvingly quotes Farmer’s argument: “Human rights violations are 
not accidents.... [They] are, rather, symptoms of deeper pathologies of power” 
(Sen 2005b: xiii). But his remarks suggest a distance from relevant literatures: 
“Farmer points to what he calls ‘structural violence’” (p.xiii), he writes, using 
quotation marks for the term coined by Johan Galtung in the 1960s; and he 
continues to do so (e.g., “details in each case help us to understand Farmer’s 
notion of ‘structural violence’”, p.xv).  
Many critics (e.g., Dean 2009, Gasper 2009, Harvey 2014) note Sen’s lack 
of attention to capitalist relations in particular, in contrast to his regular praise 
of market relations, which are presented as promoting both opportunity 
freedom and process freedom (Sen 1993, 1999a). Gangas acknowledges that 
“For all its merits, Sen’s system operates within the parameters set by current 
market mechanisms. While wisely abstaining from any utopian projection, 
Sen’s model abstracts from the systemic structure of global capitalism” (2020: 
92). The impacts of capitalist and market relations on people and on politics 
are treated relatively lightly.28 The Idea of Justice does not make clear how 
acceptable he finds the conditions under past and present capitalist systems 
that mould the formation of wants. Gangas implies though that we should try 
to distinguish between gaps in theorizing that can be filled (like that one), 
distortions that can be remedied or counteracted, and any biases that are 
irremediable (see also Gasper 2007a, 2009). 
Bonvin and Laruffa (2018: 223) agree that Sen’s 1993 ode to “Markets and 
Freedoms” was overly optimistic about the ability of a democracy to tidy up 
 
27 Ghosh goes much further and asserts: “Sen has on many occasions…stopped short 
of answering why the largest majority of Indian people still remain utterly 
superstitious or averse to scientific temperament…” (2006: 309). 
28 In contrast, Charles Lindblom, theorist of The Intelligence of Democracy (1965) in terms 
very similar to Sen’s, moved on to consider also the profoundly undemocratic 
corporate and plutocratic capture of politics, in works like The Market System (2001). 
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the social effects of an unconstrained market; instead ‘the market’ needs to be 
constitutionally constrained. In stronger language, capitalism will otherwise 
dominate the public realm. In his later work Sen himself has outlined the folly 
of a ‘I am against poverty, but I am not bothered by inequality’ stance; for 
inequality brings power differentials that distort most other matters (2005b: 
xvi). The world as a whole, like most countries, including India, has ample 
capacity to solve problems of basic health, for example, but does not do so 
(p.xvii).  
More usually though, Sen presents a generalized, optimistic notion of what 
democracy achieves: “public discussion”, leading to “a better understanding of 
the lives of others” (2009: 344). Elaborating this view, Bonvin and Laruffa 
(2018: 224) claim that compared to markets, which just take preferences as 
givens (a comment which ignores the immense efforts by capitalist businesses 
to mould preferences), democracy has a potential for questioning and 
reforming preferences, for promoting the ‘capacity to aspire’, and for 
expression of views and interests not only in proportion to purchasing power. 
Given Sen’s intra-establishment ‘gentle persuader’ style and his relative lack of 
a theory of established power, one can ask how far do high-tone emphases on 
freedom, democracy and reasoning reflect a too comfortable ‘top-table’ 
reformism? Or how far do they represent instead, perhaps even more so post-
2014, a long-term radical normative programme? 
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5 Faith in democracy as “government by discussion”, in a 
world of  wealth and emotions 
Sen’s theorizing on democracy arguably reflects the gaps in his social 
theorizing. It lacks “in-depth discussion of the political and power dynamics of 
reasoning processes and their unavoidable trade-offs” (Deneulin and 
McGregor 2009: 513). High optimism on democracy may reflect also a high 
optimism regarding reasoning self-determining individuals.29 But the distance 
between, on one hand, the eloquent rationalism in The Idea of Justice (2009) and 
in the formidable enlarged edition of Collective Choice and Social Welfare (2017a) 
and, on the other hand, the screaming and opportunistic worlds of India’s (and 
many countries’) contemporary democratic politics and its mainstream media 
and ‘social’ media appears very great.30 We might perhaps view the theorizing 
as a normative vision more than as an understanding of contemporary 
societies. For such understanding, the ideas do though contain valuable 
potentials and newer work is developing these. For an inspirational role, to 
reach audiences outside the seminar room would require further ingredients 
too (Gasper 2009, 2018).  
5.1 Ideal theory of democracy 
Sen itemizes a series of benefits of democracy, including the airing of 
information and provision of pressure to respect the interests of each citizen; 
“…democracy is not only a blessing in itself, but can also be the most 
important means to pursue public ends” (Sen 2005a: 194).31 He often uses this 
same language for discussing a free press or ‘political voice’ or electoral 
democracy or ‘public reason’/’public reasoning’ in general. He appears 
optimistic about the degree of convergence that public reasoning will bring. 
The historical record makes some of the claims appear exaggerated, as we 
noted for example concerning how far (actual) democracy counteracts market-
generated inequalities or regulates centrally imposed declarations of what is 
culturally appropriate.  
 
29 “…I do not believe that, in general, dissociation of choice from reasoning is a 
sweeping characteristic of the world in which we live” (Sen 2007b: 343). This 
standpoint seems distant from much in modern psychology, neuroscience and 
behavioural research. 
30 The Roman politician Cicero wrote of his contemporary Cato’s approach to politics: 
“he speaks and votes as if he were in the Republic of Plato, not in Romulus’s shit pit”, 
i.e. in the reality of Rome’s politics (as translated in Colin Wilson & Damon Wilson, 
2015, An End to Murder, London: Robinson). Sen does not imagine that we live in an 
ideal sphere of ‘government by discussion’ but leaves us wondering about how to 
connect ideals and realities and about what important features of reality have been left 
out from the picture of the ideal.  
31 And: “It is hard to escape the general conclusion that economic performance, social 
opportunity and political voice are deeply interrelated.” (Sen 2005a: 201).   
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However, Sen refers for at least much of the time not to mere ballot-box 
democracy but to deliberative democracy, an ideal of “government by 
discussion”: orderly reasoned open dialogue. This phrase from Victorian 
Britain comes from Walter Bagehot and the concept derives from John Stuart 
Mill. Both were later revived by James Buchanan (see, e.g., Sen 2017a: Chs. A1, 
A4). When accepting the Hirschman Prize in 2017, Sen criticized the Brexit 
decision-making procedure, for example, in which a vote by a minority of the 
total electorate after an unmoderated campaign was given more than 
consultative status, and effectively replaced a calm and carefully considered 
decision-process through the legally authorized representative Parliament after 
full and moderated discussion (Sen 2017b).  
So, “for him, democracy is not a matter of registering individual 
preferences as they are at a specific point in time, but a mechanism to allow the 
effective integration of all relevant positional objectivities in collective 
decision-making processes. In the course of such processes, individual 
preferences may be transformed and revised”, note Bonvin and Laruffa (2018: 
225). They acknowledge, however, that the prerequisites for this deliberative 
ideal – equal voice, willingness to listen openly and reflect, etc. – are nearly 
always absent. James Fishkin’s ‘deliberative polling’ exercises are instructive 
exceptions (e.g., Fishkin 2009; they are not mentioned in Sen 2017a). Sen’s 
belief in dialogical reasoned persuasion matches his oft-repeated call for case-
by-case ‘critical scrutiny’ not general slogans— which is perhaps rather remote 
from most practice in actually-existing democracies. Government by informed, 
civil discussion seems to imply much more and often much different from 
majority rule in our actual contexts of capital, nation, faction and class. Just as 
Sen has sought to reclaim the ‘freedom’ label, so he wishes to retain the kudos 
of ‘democracy’ for his rationalist ideal. But his real focus is “the role of 
reasoning in social choice” (2017a: 453), and actually-existing democracies are 
often far distant from, and even antipathetic to, ‘government by discussion’, 
perhaps increasingly so in an era of echo-chamber social media. So, should the 
same term, ’democracy’, be used for both his ideal and the actuality?  
Sen brings a remarkably sharp eye to examining notions like “recognition” 
(2005a: 35) or ‘modernity’. He demolishes “the belief that being ‘modern’ is a 
well-defined concept” (2005a: 133) or has a consistent normative significance. 
He might not be equally strict for ‘democracy’. His fondness for the 
‘government by discussion’ notion seems to conduce to sometimes using the 
term ‘democracy’ as almost automatically good, both inherently and 
instrumentally. His response to disappointment with its fruits is then typically 
to call for “a more vigorous practice of democracy” (2005a: 36).  
We should consistently distinguish at least Democracy-A (actually 
existing), including Democracy-B (ballot-box, in many electoral variants), from 
Democracy-D (deliberative; “Democracy as Public Reason”, Sen 2009; the title 
of Ch.15) and Democracy-I, which operationalizes Democracy-D plus other 
dimensions of a normative ideal, including requisites for open respectful 
discussion including fulfilment of basic human rights, as in the complex and 
widely applied methodology of IDEA, the International Institute of 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (www.idea.int; Beetham 1994). Sen 
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proposes that “the view that democracy is best seen as ‘government by 
discussion’ has gained widespread support” (2009: 324) – meaning though that 
this is his (and many others’) recommended form of democracy, not that such 
a definition is scientifically superior for understanding actual practice. 
5.2 Actual democracy and actual practice 
Democratic systems may contain many predominantly self-interested citizens. 
Even if these have equal powers, their free political participation brings biases 
towards those who are in a position to reap great benefit through a particular 
arrangement, for they have sufficient incentive to mobilize and invest to 
establish and defend it, even when it brings a much larger aggregate loss but 
one that is spread thinly over numerous other people (e.g., Sen 2017a: 400). 
This long-known danger applies in all political systems, but democracy gives it 
considerable scope and momentum, as well as potentially offering wider 
channels for resistance. For both reasons, democracy theorists call for highly 
socially responsible citizens. ‘Commitment’, including public spirit, is not an 
optional extra but instead a necessary foundation of well-functioning 
democracies, and indeed of healthy personalities. 
[T]he health and stability of a modern democracy depends, not only on the 
justice of its basic institutions, but also on the qualities and attitudes of its 
citizens: e.g. their sense of identity and how they view potentially competing 
forms of national, regional, ethnic, or religious identities; their ability to tolerate 
and work together with others who are different from themselves; their desire to 
participate in the political process in order to promote the public good and hold 
political authorities accountable; their willingness to show self-restraint and 
exercise personal responsibility in their economic demands, and in personal 
choices which affect their health and the environment. Without citizens who 
possess these qualities, democracies become difficult to govern, even unstable. 
(Kymlicka 2002: 285). 
Ghosh’s review of The Argumentative Indian concludes, in contrast, that Sen 
provides: “[no] answers to the questions: Why contemporary [Indians] are so 
deceitful in the land of the Buddha, so immodest in the land of Ashoka, Kabir, 
Guru Nanak, Sri Chaitanya and Ramakrishna, so unlawful in the land of 
Chanakya, so greedy in the land of Harsha, so intolerant in the land of Akbar, 
so ignorant in the land of Tagore and Amartya, so violent in the land of 
Gandhi, so indisciplined in the land of Vivekananda, Netaji and Patel and so 
retrogressive in the land of Nehru” (Ghosh 2006: 315). Conceivably those 
historic figures emerged precisely in reaction to longstanding prevalence of the 
problems mentioned. 
Second, citizens have very far from equal powers, and democratic systems 
do not exist in isolation. Sen speaks for a public deliberative space equally 
accessible to all, but this has never existed, not least under capitalism, and the 
space and access have been further reduced under neoliberalism, argue Dean 
(2009) and Nancy Fraser (1997).  




[any] consensual agreements achieved in the process of public deliberation - 
whether in the course of participative poverty assessments or through citizens' 
juries or focus groups - may elide fundamental conflicts and hidden oppression. 
They may do nothing more than reflect prevailing hegemonic assumptions. 
(Dean 2009: 270). 
So: “in the aftermath of several generations of neoliberal public policy, the 
‘standards of the community’ have been consistent with elected governments 
that have favoured welfare cutbacks over welfare spending and labour market 
deregulation over regulation” (Holmwood 2013: 1181). Similarly, throughout 
three generations of democratic India the balance of public policy has never 
been pro-poor. The state of “government by discussion” in contemporary 
India, and also in the USA, the second largest democracy, or the UK with its 
“Mother of Parliaments”, is disturbing in many respects. Democracy-A is 
frequently remote from “Democracy as Public Reason”. 
5.3 Democracy in India – Sen’s unwilling hero 
Sen is keenly aware that Indian democracy (and Indian media) has over seventy 
years shown relatively little interest in hunger or mass education or mass 
morbidity (e.g., 2017a: 403 ff.). As he recognises, India’s extreme inequality, 
including in education and health, seems to undermine its democratic forms 
(Gasper 2018). His ‘no famines in a democracy’ hypothesis does not appear 
transferable beyond famines.32 The key required mechanism is not merely 
balloting but democracy’s “ability to make people take an interest, through 
public discussion, in each other’s predicaments, and to have a better 
understanding of the lives of others” (Sen 2009: 344). But as he knows, ‘ability’ 
means here only a potential. “Sen is not unaware that in a poverty stricken and 
illiterate democracy, the ‘intermediate regimes’ are more alert and effective…to 
extract ‘rent’” (Ghosh 2006: 313). He has explored the paradox of an India 
with vast food surpluses and yet vast malnutrition, and notes “how little public 
attention it gets, when it gets any at all” (Sen 2005a: 212-3). Instead old myths 
prevail, that ‘we’ have plenty of food available, ‘so’ the idle poor must be failing 
to work. He sees how rich farmers have dominated the democratic polity to 
obtain high food prices (2005a: 214-5; 2015) and holds then that we need more 
 
32 For famines too, the thesis must be refined from ‘no famine in a democracy’ to at 
least ‘no famine in “a functioning democracy with regular elections, opposition 
parties, basic freedom of speech and relatively free media”’ (Sen 2009: 342). Even this 
description might still fit some famine cases. For the 1943 Bengal famine, Sen 
remarks: “There was of course no parliament in India under the British colonial 
administration” (2009: 339), by which he means no national parliament. He mentions 
though “the local Bengal government” (p.340) but does not discuss its role, nor that 
of the elected Bengal Assembly. The provincial government was led in 1943 by first 
the Krishak Praja Party and the Hindu Mahasabha under Shyam Prasad Mukherjee, 
and then from April 1943 to March 1945 by the Muslim League, with Sir Khawaja 
Nazimuddin as Prime Minister of Bengal. But while we should beware reduction of 
the position about no famine “in a functioning democracy” (p.343) to a tautology, the 
theme remains important even if the thesis correctly concerns ‘less’ not ‘no’ famine. 
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democracy. By that he no doubt intends much more involvement of well-
informed, well-mobilized poorer groups, capable of acting and unafraid to act. 
But what issues mobilize the poor in reality? His other proposed remedy for 
failings of democracy is more education, but India’s democratic political 
system has produced far too little education for the poor. 
Sen’s constant call for public reasoning leaves him wary of over-
generalized rules. The ideal reasoner proposes ‘let’s reason’ for each specific 
case, more than ‘let’s institution-build’ in the form of pre-set fixed guarantees. 
Yet countering institutionalized injustices requires institutionalized forms for 
justice. Invariable insistence on situational reasoning could reflect a sociological 
naivete. To leave the operationalization of justice to be discussed afresh in each 
situation, without constitutionally fixed prioritizations, leaves too much power 
to the powerful (Nussbaum 2003; Gasper 2007a). The best can become enemy 
of the good. Sen has called Ambedkar “father of my economics”, yet his 
writings on justice may give more prominence to Smith and Mill than to 
Ambedkar or the Indian Constitution.  
Ambedkar knew that the Constitution would be hobbled if not 
accompanied by a battle against caste, disgust-based social hierarchy. While Sen 
illuminates human complexity in many respects, he may understate it in some 
others and thus under-specify human personhood and potentials. He lacks 
theories of the demos, of the crowd, and of populism (cf. Canetti 1962). His 
essay on the national trait of preoccupation with ‘first in class’ (“The Country 
of First Boys”, in his book of the same name, 2015) does not situate it within a 
perspective on social hierarchy and caste. In his and Drèze’s conspectus of 
contemporary India, An Uncertain Glory, “the agents are not strongly 
highlighted. We read a thoughtful diagnosis of mistakes, oversights, blind 
spots; but less about the agents who commit them, and their passions and 
perceptions, likes and dislikes” (Gasper 2018: 284). The book admits that “we 
know very little about which institutions matter” for development (Drèze and 
Sen 2013: 36), but this applies also to Western forms of political democracy: 
Democracy-A and -B, and possibly Democracy-D too. Drèze and Sen 
acknowledge the insufficiency of India’s Democracy-A: the “strongly 
incriminating evidence against taking Indian democracy to be adequately 
successful in consequential terms” (2013: 244). Nor has Democracy-D reached 
far, including in the Congress decades; “public discussion[s] in India, as [he and 
Drèze] show, are completely dominated by affluent groups and their concerns. 
Indian [mass-]media provide[d] little or no coverage of the lives of half the 
country (except in constant attacks on pro-poor programmes)” (Gasper 2018: 
284), while “the relatively privileged seem to have created a social [and mental] 
universe of their own” (Drèze and Sen 2013: 268). 
Drèze and Sen present injustice, corruption and lack of dignity as 
problems to be calmly analysed and counteracted. Persuasive power in actually 
existing democracies seems, however, often to come less through ‘critical 
scrutiny’ and appeals to a general ideal of freedom than through a “set of 
mobilizing ‘myths’ about an imaginable desirable attainable future, anger-




5.4 Mobilizing capability theory to better understand 
democracy 
Sen’s ideas do inspire many researchers. The capability approach is an ongoing 
stream of inquiry and gradually more realistic attention is being given to 
democracy. Bonvin and Laruffa (2018: 227) argue that: “in contrast to the 
idealistic approach to deliberative democracy, the CA has great potential for 
developing a more realistic analysis of democratic processes – one that takes 
into account the teachings of sociological studies (Bonvin et al., 2018) … 
[First] The purpose is not to reach a view from nowhere where citizens are 
called to put aside their positions and interests, but to let situated views 
communicate and debate. … Sen’s theory does not follow the ‘abstraction 
strategy’ of deliberative democrats…”.  
Second, the CA apparatus for discussing conversion factors can help in 
understanding the limits of formal democracy in converting formal rights into 
equal participation. It “allows a sociologically grounded understanding of how 
individual agency and social structures interact in the formation of 
preferences” (Bonvin and Laruffa 2018: 228). The “allows” here reflects the 
need to build on but extend Sen’s thinking, although the ‘adaptive preference’ 
idea gives a start for considering limitations on people’s aspirations and their 
capacity to speak. Bonvin and Laruffa connect the requirements for effective 
democracy to Appadurai’s idea of capacity to aspire (rendered as “ability to 
form one’s preferences”; 2018: 222) and to “capability for voice”, the ability to 
speak and be heard. The approach brings a focus on incremental 
improvements from where one starts, not with defining a perfect ideal. 
...this specific understanding of democracy departs [i.e. diverges] both from 
market mechanisms and from ideal conceptions of deliberative democracy. ...it 
develops rigorous empirical tools for the sociological investigation of democratic 
processes and how these are impacted by material, symbolic and deliberative 
inequalities. In our view, the CA’s main contribution [here] is to shed light on ... 
how preferences are formed (in connection with the notion of capacity to aspire) 
and how they are then called to confront and coordinate themselves when 
collective decision-making takes place (this calls for examining the differential 
degree of capability for voice enjoyed by the various stakeholders). As such, the 
CA opens up a new field of research for a more appropriate sociological 
understanding of democratic processes. (Bonvin and Laruffa 2018: 230).33 
Much more must be added, regarding the formation of selves, crowd 
psychology and the power systems which can drive identity formation in ways 
far different from the reflective, sophisticated, open-minded ideal articulated 
by Sen. “...the reasoned deliberation that Sen is looking for requires much 
more than reason” (Giri 2002: 239). Sen’s work makes contributions though 
not only as a normative vision but also towards rendering such a vision more 
practical and realistic, using capability approach concepts including, as we saw 
earlier, its “series of items suited for empirical inquiry – opportunities, 
 
33 Venkataraman expresses similar hopes in regard “to understand[ing] the subtleties 
of exclusion in education” in India (2016: 3). 
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resources, entitlements, conversion factors, achievements” (Zimmermann 
2018: 284), amongst others. These might help to structure a workable research 
programme, usefully refined but not too abstruse, hence perhaps able to—
‘democratically’—mobilize interest and efforts by contributors drawn from 
across the social sciences.   
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6 Conclusion – valuable for sociology and in need of  
sociology 
Sen should be of interest for sociologists and others outside economics, not as 
an explicit ‘social theorist’ but as a penetrating social analyst and thoughtful 
philosopher of freedom and democracy. While his work is an outlier in terms 
of social theory, and has various limitations, it has major strengths too and a 
global following, perhaps greater than that of any Indian sociologist. It opens 
new areas and provides important tools if not a conventional grand social 
theory. Hunger and famine. for example, have not been central topics in 
sociology, yet should be. Sen’s work is both an attempt to understand 
contemporary realities, and a programmatic vision of human freedom and its 
growth and promotion. From this perspective, “the ultimate concern has to be 
the lives we can or cannot lead. ...ultimately economics and sociology look at 
different aspects of the same phenomenon, viz. the lives of human beings in 
society” (Sen 1990a: 266).  
Like other choice-and-freedom centred social analysts he raises also a 
challenge to some sociology, the intellectual field created to be a broad science 
of society distinct from or subsuming economics. Sen has sought to reform 
economics not to exit from it and, we saw, has sought to recapture the potent 
term freedom from apostles of unrestrained markets. We saw that his main 
teachers in social theorizing have perhaps been from pre- and early-modern 
eras, before the full separation-out of autonomous market systems and before 
the separation of economics and sociology. In some ways, debates in 17th 
through 19th century Britain and France were indeed useful sources for 
thinking about 20th century India. Davis (2003: 166) argues though that the 
picture of the timeless reasoning individual found in Descartes and Locke 
antedates industrialization and the corresponding transformations of society 
and increased perception of persons and society as transformable in time. 
Davis presents (2003: 182-3) the challenge for the modern social sciences as 
having been, and continuing to be, to understand the socially embedded 
individual not the disembedded Descartes-Locke reasoner; a challenge that he 
considers Adam Smith began to address. Sen proceeds from the intellectual 
legacies of Smith, Mill, Dewey and Tagore, but adds various tools, while 
leaving as we have seen much scope for combining with the insights of others. 
The Idea of Justice concludes with the reflection that: “The pursuit of a theory of 
justice has something to do with…: what is it like to be be a human being?” 
(Sen 2009: 414). We saw that Sen transcends homo economicus or the mutilated 
loners assumed in “the so-called Rational Choice Theory” (2007b: 342); he 
invokes human proclivities to sympathy and social commitment, abilities “to 
reason, argue, disagree and concur” (2009: 415), and desires for freedom, 
affiliation and identity. However, given his relative neglect of modern 
psychology, sociology and anthropology, we need to add in many areas. 
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We saw that Gangas’ recent book (2020) on Sociological Theory and the 
Capability Approach takes up part of this challenge.34 It warns of 
“underestimation of social structures and institutions by CA” (p.219), with 
specific reference to Sen, and the consequent “risks of getting trapped into … 
an overestimation of its normative potential” (p.259). The book seeks to repair 
this. It connects CA to high social theory, including Weber and especially 
Durkheim and their synthesiser Parsons, as well as to the philosophies of Kant 
and Hegel that nourished their thinking, and to many recent sociological 
theorists. Gangas argues that Parsons provides some of the social theory 
underpinning that Sen requires. First, Parsons reflected in depth on the 
capacities required for the social actor to participate as a full citizen, and 
second, his conception of ‘institutionalized individualism’ “offers a template 
for a theory of social institutions and role-complexes, upon which the capable 
actor’s goal orientations are normatively grounded and evaluatively sanctioned” 
(Gangas 2020: 124). However, Parsons’ concept of capacities was not as 
helpfully concrete and operational as Sen’s notion of capability (p.131). So, 
using the CA can lead one to ask about social structures and how they affect 
what people can do. As yet, “CA has only partially articulated the institutional 
presuppositions of the ‘good’ and ‘just’ society [and the] institutional pathways 
to the [central human capabilities]” (Gangas 2020: 29).35 Sociological theories 
can enrich “visualizing how the capable self’s choices and freedoms are 
supported [and constrained] by social institutions” (p.10; my addition). 
Sen’s work offers sociology “a resourceful conception of agency aligned to 
a vision of a good society” (Gangas 2020: 111). Parsons, Etzioni, Giddens and 
others were close to such a conception of agency, while Durkheim made clear 
the importance of such visions in cohesive societies and also in social 
sciences.36 For we study society in large part because we consider human life 
valuable, improvable, and to try to improve it; we must then pay attention to 
what improvement means. The capability approach—or, more fully specified, a 
‘human development approach’ (Nussbaum 2011; Gasper 2005b)—offers, 
Gangas suggests, one normative framework for a normatively deepened 
sociology. Such a manifesto leads beyond Sen’s own work and gives an agenda 
for research to test how far it can be taken.  
 
 
34 Some chapters of Gangas’s deeply thoughtful study are readily accessible, as are his 
journal papers. Some parts (e.g. Ch.1) unfortunately illustrate, in contrast to Sen’s 
work, difficulties in communication across disciplines, and might be found 
overabstract, overloaded, and hard to penetrate by some readers from other fields.  
35 Not the least of these institutional requisites is “a meta-level of coordination of 
citizens’ commitment to a liberal culture that does not collapse under the freedoms it 
secures and provides for its citizens” (Gangas 2020: 182). 
36 Gasper (2005a) presents an integration of the formats of capability theory, human 
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